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Energy efﬁciency retroﬁts are often impeded by high perceived investment risks, long payback periods
and a lack of skills. At the municipal level these issues are particularly pronounced as procuring,
implementing, and managing retroﬁts can exceed existing municipal governance capacities. The diffu-
sion of municipal LED street lighting as a replacement for conventional lighting serves as an example.
This paper argues that technological (e.g. complexity and maturity), economic (e.g. selling services vs.
products and ﬁnancing costs), institutional (e.g. property situation and contracts) and competency
barriers to retroﬁtting (e.g. lack of measurement capacity and qualiﬁed facilitators) translate into
transaction costs. We develop a taxonomy of appropriate modes of municipal retroﬁtting governance
based on transaction costs economics. The ﬁndings indicate that more market-based solutions, energy
performance contracts in particular, can facilitate the procurement of innovative energy efﬁciency ret-
roﬁtting solutions and associated investments among municipalities if neutral tenders, open-book ac-
counting, municipal ownership and intermediary organisations allow municipalities to choose
appropriate governance structures for particular technologies and retroﬁts.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Energy efﬁciency is the cheapest and most effective way of
addressing issues such as climate change energy security, rising
energy prices and associated social implications such as fuel
poverty (EC, 2014; IEA, 2014a, 2014b; IPCC, 2014). As a result of
incomplete energy efﬁciency markets, investments in associated
technologies remain below the optimal level (IEA, 2013). Conse-
quently, the rate of adoption and diffusion is low because structures
and incentives for application are missing (Jaffe et al., 2005;
Schleich, 2009; Sorrell et al., 2004).
Municipalities in particular face difﬁculties in procuring,
implementing and managing energy efﬁciency projects although
these investments can alleviate ﬁnancial constraints in the long run
and help municipalities meet climate change targets (Bratt et al.,
2013; Dena, 2015; Nolden et al., 2015; Radulovic et al., 2011;stitute (SBI), Zehnthofstr. 1,
r Ltd. This is an open access articleSch€onberger, 2013; Singh et al., 2010; Testa et al., 2016). Procur-
ing public sector energy efﬁciency retroﬁts and services through
outsourcing (relational, long-term or performance-based energy
contracts) may help overcome some of these barriers (Aasen et al.,
2016). This process and various municipal governance options for
procuring and retroﬁtting have received relatively little academic
attention (P€at€ari and Sinkkonen, 2014).
With energy efﬁciency gains of up to 90% compared to con-
ventional lighting, LED streetlights provide a good example for the
analysis of governance options of municipal energy efﬁciency
procurement and retroﬁtting (Bennich et al., 2014; De Almeida
et al., 2014). This paper analyses the role of different municipal
governance arrangements for procuring, implementing and man-
aging innovative energy demand reduction technologies (EUEDs)
that reduce the absolute consumption of primary energy and the
delivery of energy services using the example of Germany (Herring,
2006; Wilson et al., 2012). Germany is a particularly interesting
research setting due to its diverse municipal energy service
governance arrangements and corresponding procurement and
retroﬁtting activities. This paper combines research on energy
service markets (Bertoldi et al., 2014; Marino et al., 2011, 2010;under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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transaction cost economics (TCE) (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Sorrell,
2007; Toffel, 2002).
The paper argues that, in the absence of appropriate municipal
(in-house) governance structures capable of diffusing EUEDs,
market-based solutions such as (performance-based or relational)
energy service contracts can accelerate their commercialisation and
diffusion. The transaction cost analysis reveals that municipal
competencies represent a key factor for choosing an appropriate
mode of governance for procuring and implementing EUED retro-
ﬁts. Our research, which combines a longitudinal archival docu-
ment analysis with 40 semi-structured interviews, addresses the
following research question: What is the appropriate mode of
governance for procuring and retroﬁtting EUEDs and delivering asso-
ciated energy services in municipalities?
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2
reviews the relevant literature and introduces the theoretical
framework. The research design including the qualitative research
approach and the data is presented in Section 3. Section 4 displays
the results which form the basis for discussion (Section 5) and
conclusion (Section 6), including policy and management
implications.
2. Literature review and analytical framework
2.1. Challenges facing adoption of novel end-use energy demand
technologies
Compared to supply side low-carbon technologies, EUEDs have
been marginalised, despite their diffusion considered essential to
reach climate change targets while reducing costs and fossil-fuel
dependency (Cagno and Trianni, 2014; IEA, 2014a, 2014b;
Mickwitz et al., 2008; Sovacool, 2009). Wilson et al. (2012) attri-
bute this to the nature of these technologies, such as their diversity
and widespread application, small scale and low visibility. These
factors hinder diffusion because they limit the individual rate of
adoption (Rogers, 1995).
In general, barriers to diffusion arise from complex interde-
pendent factors that relate to the nature of innovative technologies
and environmental externalities (see Table 1). In this paper we
differentiate between technological, institutional, economic and
capacity factors. Technological factors comprise uncertainty about
the dominant design, quality and increasing complexity of inno-
vative technologies and application (Foxon and Pearson, 2008;
Schleich, 2009; Sorrell et al., 2004; van Soest and Bulte, 2001).
Institutional barriers include path-dependent technological appli-
cation associated with investments into corresponding infrastruc-
ture, low acceptance among the local population or unanticipated
or reoccurring changes in the policy design and slowadministrative
approval (Foxon and Pearson, 2008; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005;
Wilson et al., 2012). Volatile or artiﬁcially low energy prices andTable 1
Barriers to the diffusion of EUEDs.
Barriers to the
diffusion (of
EUED)
Examples
Technological Standards, complexity, maturity, ‘reverse salients’ (i.e. unanticipate
technological, environmental or social consequences), missing infr
Institutional/
political
Path-dependency, low acceptance, inadequate political environme
administrative procedures, information asymmetries
Economic/
ﬁnancial
Investment risk, (small) scale, low energy prices, incomplete carbo
(externalities), long payback periods, inappropriate business mode
Competency Low visibility, other priorities, lack of time and capacities to evalua
markets, lack of demand-articulating competenciesmissing or incomplete carbon markets represent economic barriers
to diffusion by increasing uncertainty (Gallagher et al., 2006; Jaffe
et al., 2005; Sorrell et al., 2004). Investments in innovative EUEDs
may be unproﬁtable as a result of long payback periods relating to
high upfront costs and uncertainty about energy savings (Sorrell
et al., 2004).
Finally, potential users require enhanced competencies and ca-
pacities to evaluate and implement innovative EUEDs (Klein
Woolthuis et al., 2005; Schleich, 2009; Sorrell et al., 2004; Testa
et al., 2016). As a result, customers often ‘wait’ for future im-
provements and fail to harness current savings. This is referred to as
the ‘energy efﬁciency paradox’ (van Soest and Bulte, 2001). At the
municipal level, the tendency to wait for future improvements and
associated backlogs are particularly pronounced (Jensen et al.,
2010). These factors represent key barriers for a range of EUEDs,
including lighting, which this paper seeks to address (De Almeida
et al., 2014; Fouquet and Pearson, 2006; Mills and Schleich, 2014).
2.2. Modes of governance for EUED procurement and retroﬁtting
In order to address the barriers to EUED diffusion, policy-makers
are confronted with a number of measures to support the demand-
side, such as regulation, public procurement, support of private
demand (e.g. subsidies, tax incentives) and systemic policies (e.g.
clusters) (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). Throughout this paper we
focus in particular on public procurement alongside management
and implementation as it has been identiﬁed as a crucial step for
the diffusion of clean technologies such as EUEDs (Edler and
Georghiou, 2007; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012; Guer-
zoni and Raiteri, 2015; Testa et al., 2016). At the municipal level,
policy-makers are presented with the choice of either sourcing
innovative solutions directly in-house, procuring via relational
contracts, via long-term contracts or via performance contracts (see
Table 2, based on Williamson, 1985). The literature has highlighted
the design of contractual arrangements (mode of governance)
regarding contract duration and responsibilities as a critical factor
for addressing risk and complexity especially during the procure-
ment process (Hall et al., 2016; Hartmann et al., 2014; Pint and
Baldwin, 1997; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014; Sorrell, 2005).
Hartmann et al. (2014, p. 174) suggest that public sector organisa-
tions such as municipalities need to 'identify the procurement level
and the contractual and relational challenges involved’ in a public-
private partnership (PPP) to increase the economic viability and
ensure the appropriate distribution of risks and beneﬁts.
The in-house option maximises municipal control over pro-
curement, as well as implementation and management, and
appropriation of anticipated savings in energy and cost. However,
this process is subject to a set of barriers perceived by suppliers of
(green) innovative goods, such as the lack of interaction with pro-
curing organisations, over-speciﬁed tenders, missing environ-
mental criteria, low competencies of the procurers and poorReferences
d
astructure
(Foxon and Pearson, 2008; Gee and McMeekin, 2011; Schleich, 2009;
Sorrell et al., 2004)
nt, (Chadha, 2011; Foxon and Pearson, 2008; Henriot, 2013; Klein
Woolthuis et al., 2005; K€ohler et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2012)
n markets
ls
(Gallagher et al., 2006; Jaffe et al., 2005; Kenney and Hargadon, 2012;
Kley et al., 2011; Sorrell et al., 2004; Hall et al., 2016)
te EUED (Markard and Truffer, 2008; Schleich, 2009; Sorrell et al., 2004; Testa
et al., 2016; Weber and Rohracher, 2012)
Table 2
Modes of governance for the procurement of EUEDs.
Mode of governance Characteristics from a municipal perspective References
In-house
procurement
Complete control over the procurement and retroﬁtting process, the client bears all
risks (related to barriers of diffusion)
(Testa et al., 2016; Uyarra et al., 2014)
MUCO (relational
contracts)
Partial or complete ownership over the third party that carries out the retroﬁtting
via a contract, risks partially transferred to third-party, no performance targets
(Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Hannon
and Bolton, 2015; Hartmann et al., 2014; Roehrich et al., 2014)
EUCO (long-term
contracts)
Partial ownership exceptional, contracts usually do not provide for contingencies or
allow municipal interference, no performance targets
(Berlo and Wagner, 2013; Hannon et al., 2013)
ESCO (long-term
performance
contracts)
No ownership, details about risk-sharing and other responsibilities (i.e. performance
targets) in the contract, guaranteed savings as a result of the retroﬁtting process
(Hannon and Bolton, 2015; Marino et al., 2011; P€at€ari and
Sinkkonen, 2014; Sorrell, 2007, 2005)
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2016; Uyarra et al., 2014).
Relational contracts allow the public organisation to beneﬁt from
private sector organisational effectiveness and efﬁciency in
providing services without losing strategic control. Depending on
municipal risk-aversion, the extent to which the municipality
wants to retain strategic control, the resources it has at its disposal
and the surrounding regulatory framework, the municipality may
choose (partial) ownership over the third party that carriers out
retroﬁts and provides energy services (Hannon and Bolton, 2015).
Relational contracting is of particular relevance in the German
context as many municipalities have links to Municipal Utility
Companies (MUCOs - known as Stadtwerke) (Bulkeley and Kern,
2006). MUCOs tend to provide a wide range of utilities such as
gas, electricity and municipal waste management. Strong local
embedding ensures that these MUCOs enjoy near monopolies on
most supply and waste streams, which can provide incentives for
integrated solutions (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006).
The third alternative is a long-term contract, usually with an
Energy Utility Company (EUCO), which typically engages in energy
generation and supply at a national or international level. Long-
term contracts with EUCOs are similar to relational contracts with
MUCOs although municipalities are unlikely to have a stake in a
EUCO. As a result, EUCOs are less likely to offer integrated solutions
(Hannon et al., 2013). The incentive to ‘wait’ for future improve-
ments rather than harnessing current savings is also greater for
EUCOs than for MUCOs (Berlo and Wagner, 2013). Both relational
and long-term contracts can be a solution in case public sector
organisations, such as municipalities, run on very tight budgets
(Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Hartmann et al., 2014; Roehrich et al.,
2014).
The ﬁnal option is outsourcing using energy performance con-
tracts (EPCs). EPCs are a sub-category of energy service contracts
usually offered by Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) (Nolden et al.,
2015; Sorrell, 2007). According to Sorrell (2007, pp. 507e508)
ESCOs ‘typically offer comprehensive contracts that include energy
information and control systems, energy audits, installation, oper-
ation and maintenance of equipment, competitive ﬁnance, and fuel
and electricity purchasing. These contracts transfer the decision
rights over key items of energy equipment including incentives to
maintain and improve equipment performance over time’. In this
paper we refer to all companies offering innovative performance-
based business models such as EPCs as ESCOs. EPCs can enable
the cost-effective supply for a subset of energy services (Nolden
et al., 2015; Sorrell, 2007). This is likely to be the case if they can
offer specialised solutions. Independent ESCOs offering EPCs tend
to beneﬁt from the absence of long term contracts with manufac-
turers, which may lead to lock-in regarding the choice of technol-
ogy, and they often incur lower costs for procuring equipment
(Helle, 1997; P€at€ari and Sinkkonen, 2014; Sorrell, 2007). In an EPC,
the ESCO assumes control over secondary energy conversion and
control equipment that converts primary energy streams intouseful energy such as heating and lighting (Sorrell, 2007, 2005).
This allows the ESCO to identify, deliver and maintain savings using
guarantees for certain standards (e.g. lighting) at a cost typically
lower than its customers' current or projected energy bill (Hannon
et al., 2013; Marino et al., 2011; Sorrell, 2007).
2.3. Analytical framework: transaction cost economics
Transaction cost economics (TCE) represents a prominent
theoretical perspective for analysing modes of governance and
institutional structures between hierarchies and markets (Delmas,
1999; Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015; Williamson, 1985). Trans-
action costs (TCs) depend on how the transaction is organised
through governance structures and TCE makes ‘several key as-
sumptions about managerial behaviour when determining which
governance structure is most efﬁcient for a particular transaction’
(Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002, p. 2). TCs are incurred within
organisations through managing and monitoring personnel, pro-
curing inputs and capital investment, and ‘the costs associated with
organising (‘governing’) the provision of […] streams and/or ser-
vices’ (Sorrell, 2007, p. 512). When the same streams and/or ser-
vices are sourced from an external provider, transaction costs are
associated with source selection, contract management and per-
formance monitoring, dispute resolution and opportunistic
behaviour (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Sorrell, 2007). Transactions are
governed through structures, which are located on a spectrumwith
hierarchical organisations (internal) at one end, spot markets
(external) at the other, and hybrid mechanisms in between (Pint
and Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002). With increasingly complex cus-
tomisation of services, more hierarchical governance structures
may be appropriate to allow for adjustments to contingencies (such
as the emergence of more efﬁcient technologies) over the life of a
contract (Pint and Baldwin, 1997). According to TCE, the choice
between market-based, long-term contracts (outsourcing) and hi-
erarchies (in-house provision) depends on the magnitude of asso-
ciated transaction (TCs) and production costs (PCs).
The choice of governance structure also depends on character-
istics of transactions as investment in transaction-speciﬁc (dedi-
cated) assets may improve the efﬁciency of some transactions (Pint
and Baldwin, 1997). A MUCO, EUCO or ESCO may already have ac-
quired skills, equipment for both operation and maintenance
(O&M) and measurement and veriﬁcation (M&V) and established
links with manufacturers. Acquired skills and the buyer-seller
relationship can be classiﬁed as human capital speciﬁcity while
specialised equipment falls under technical asset speciﬁcity. Dedi-
cated resources is the degree to which organisations support a
particular transaction (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002). The
assumption is that transactions featuring high technical asset spec-
iﬁcity and dedicated resources are less likely to operate efﬁciently
within market transactions as the party that has not invested may
threaten to cancel the contract to expropriate some of the invested
value. Additional factors that inﬂuence the TCs of contracting are
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and the complexity of monitoring performance according to
contractual terms and conditions), the competitiveness of the energy
service market and the institutional context in which contracting
takes place (Sorrell, 2005). The institutional context can be affected
by standardised tendering and procurement procedures and
standardised measurement and veriﬁcation (M&V). Clients such as
municipalities are only likely to enter a long-term contract or
performance contract if useful energy streams and ﬁnal energy
services can be supplied at a lower total cost compared to their
provision using other modes of governance. Total costs are the sum
of PCs, ‘the expenditures for inputs such as fuel and electricity’,
which depend on technical and operational efﬁciency of the
equipment, and TCs as outlined in this section (Sorrell, 2007, p.
512). Table 3 summarises the factors that determine the viability of
an energy-service contract.3. Methodology
3.1. Research design
To address our research question, we employed the TCE model
(see Section 2.3) originally developed by Williamson (1985) and
speciﬁed by Toffel (2002), Pint and Baldwin (1997) and Sorrell
(2007). Sorrell's (2007) model in particular focuses on the eco-
nomics of energy service contracts, which allows the analysis of
modes of governance and their capacity to diffuse innovative
EUEDs. We applied the framework to help understand which fac-
tors affecting TC represent drivers or barriers for the procurement
of EUEDs among the modes of governance.
To develop an empirically-based perspective, a qualitative
inductive methodology was applied (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009).
Within this frame, we chose analytic induction since we based our
empirical work on an initial theoretical perspective also referred to
as ‘abduction’ (Mantere, 2008; Patton, 2002). We conducted a case
study to integrate different data sources and to holistically research
a phenomenon within its real-life context, which is especially
relevant when the limitations of the phenomenon are not clearly
deﬁned. Yet, the ﬁndings represent patterns rather than statistically
validated results, which limits their generalizability. A case study
can be deﬁned as ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose
of understanding a larger class of (similar) units’ (Gerring, 2004, p.
342). When selecting a case, scholars need to ponder between the
dimensions of representativeness and useful variation of the sam-
ple (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Our analysis covers municipal
street lighting as a case since it represents one of the most relevant
and typical application for EUEDs and public procurement world-
wide (De Almeida et al., 2014; McKinsey, 2012; Mills and Schleich,
2014; Radulovic et al., 2011).Table 3
Modes of governance for the procurement of EUEDs.
Viability of modes of governance TC-related factors Examples
In-house, MUCO, EUCO or ESCO
solutions
Technical asset
speciﬁcity
Specialised equipment su
Human capital speciﬁcity Dedicated human resourc
Dedicated resources Specialisation in a particu
Task complexity Replacing old lighting tec
monitoring performance
Competitiveness of the
market
Number of entries/exits in
Institutional framework Regulation for energy efﬁ3.2. Case study: LED street lighting governance in German
municipalities
Lighting technology is currently going through a transition
phase from traditional lighting technologies towards LED (De
Almeida et al., 2014; McKinsey, 2012; ZVEI, 2015). Although LEDs
are on the path towards technological maturity, industry-wide
standards for ﬁttings are still missing (for an extensive discussion
of the evolution of lighting and services see Fouquet and Pearson,
2006). This transition fundamentally affects the business model
of street lighting providers, such as municipalities, as original in-
vestments often date back 40e60 years. Major initial investments
are necessary to retroﬁt existing street lighting stock and to tap into
long-term energy efﬁciency beneﬁts and savings associated with
new technologies such as LEDs.
9.5 million public street lights installed in Germany consume
approximately 4 TWh of electricity per year. Corresponding energy
costs of about V750 m/a represent approximately one third of
municipal energy costs. Municipal pricing models range from
standard tariffs, to reduced tariffs for lighting to a pay-per-street-
light, depending on the mode of governance. German municipal-
ities are typically conﬁned by budget restrictions as total municipal
debt amounted to V133.6bn in 2013 (Difu, 2014; DStGB, 2014). The
potential savings of switching to energy efﬁcient lighting systems
(especially LEDs) in Germany amount to V400 m/a (Dena, 2012;
DStGB, 2010). Germany's market for public street lighting is high-
ly dispersed, consisting of more than 11,000 municipalities with
individual decision-makers.
Historically, different forms of municipal street lighting gover-
nance have emerged. In Germany 27% of municipalities provide
street lighting in-house. 10% delegated (partially outsourced) the
management to MUCOs. 35% outsourced lighting management to
EUCOs. 25% partially outsourced services such as maintenance. 3%
of German municipalities use ESCO solutions (Dena, 2012). Fig. 1
depicts our units of analysis, the main actors that take part in the
procurement and retroﬁtting process. LED manufacturers produce
the lamps which can be used either by municipalities directly if
they own/operate the street lighting or by MUCOs, EUCOs or ESCOs
if these entities assume control over the equipment. The retroﬁt-
ting process is hampered by technological, institutional, compe-
tency and economic factors. Facilitators, such as energy agencies
and consultants, can accompany the process by providing advice.
Regulatory bodies oversee municipal ﬁnances and may (dis-)
approve budgets, especially when a municipality is heavily
indebted. Financiers mostly consist of (government-owned) banks,
such as Germany's KfW bank, who ﬁnance municipalities as well as
MUCOs, EUCOs and ESCOs. Germany has 4 EUCOs and around 900
MUCOs supplying energy (services) (Energy Transition, 2013). ESCO
solutions are gaining acceptance among customers although the
market has reached only 10% of its potential (Duscha et al., 2013).
We identiﬁed 10 companies that offer ESCO lighting services to
municipalities, which include subsidiaries of EUCOs orReferences
ch as cranes, intelligent lighting etc. (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Sorrell, 2007;
Toffel, 2002)
es for retroﬁtting (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002)
lar area (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002)
hnology with novel LED and (Sorrell, 2007, 2005)
the energy service market (Sorrell, 2007, 2005)
ciency or municipal budgets (Sorrell, 2007, 2005)
Fig. 1. Overview of actors and modes of lighting governance for LED diffusion.
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As established in Section 2.3, the choice of supplier represents a
choice of governance structure. In-house provision represents a
hierarchical governance structure. MUCO contracts can be consid-
ered relational contracts as they focus on the terms of the rela-
tionship. Shifting business models between privatisation (market)
or ‘recommunalisation’ (hierarchy) may result in dynamic re-
lationships between a municipality and its MUCO. EUCO contracts
are likely to fall under the category of long-term contracts. ESCO
solutions represent long-term performance contracts, the most
market-based governance structure for street lighting (see Table 4).
It is assumed that the complexity of long-term (performance)
contracts compared to relational contracts or conventional in-
house procurement of equipment increases the TCs of negotiating
and managing the relationship with the (energy) service provider
or manufacturer (human capital speciﬁcity). Consequently, PCs
resulting from the physical characteristics of the energy system and
the technical efﬁciency of organisational arrangements need to be
lower for associatedmodes of governance to be economically viable
(Sorrell, 2007).
The case study of governance modes for public sector LED street
lighting provides a good example as potential savings are high (LED
modules are ten times more efﬁcient than halogen for the same
light output although the overall system efﬁciency is lower as
losses occur due LED drivers and conﬁguration of the lamp) and the
capacity of municipalities to invest in these EUEDs is limited
(Bennich et al., 2014; DStGB, 2014, 2010). Municipal beneﬁts of
abandoning the in-house approach in favour of more market based
solutions may include reductions in energy costs, less exposure to
energy price ﬂuctuation and the transfer of risk, allowing the mu-
nicipality to focus on core activities. More market-based modes of
governance, however, imply a loss of municipal control and ﬂexi-
bility. There is a danger of third-party contractors cherry-picking
the most proﬁtable municipal tenders to the detriment of less
attractive ones.Table 4
Spectrum of governance structures for municipal street lighting in Germany (adapted fr
Hierarchies /
Vertical integration Relational contracts Long-term contracts
Examples
In-house lighting
provision
MUCO contract for lighting
provision
EUCO contract for lightin
provision3.3. Data collection
Data was ﬁrstly collected through an extensive longitudinal
archival document analysis (i.e. context of lighting and municipal
public procurement from 2008 to 2013). This period covers the
main commercialisation phase of LED lighting in Germany (De
Almeida et al., 2014). Secondly, interviews allowed us to reﬂect
upon changes in the industry and institutional context. The litera-
ture review covered industry reports for lighting and energy ser-
vices and public procurement reports compiled by industry experts
such as energy agencies, ofﬁcial government bodies or industry
associations.
Themain empirical focus of this paper is the analysis of 40 semi-
structured interviews with key stakeholders. The interviews took
place from October 2013 until January 2014. We selected interview
partners according to an approach suggested by Seawright and
Gerring (2008). Following an initial screening and a consultation
of experts from Germany's ‘LED Lead Market Initiative’, we selected
the most inﬂuential stakeholders in the process of LED application
in German municipalities that directly engage in the process of
street lighting modernisation (see Fig. 1) (BMBF, 2014).
For each of the modes of governance we compiled typical cases
that are representative (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Hence we
combined snowball sampling and purposeful sampling strategies.
An overview of our sample can be drawn from Table A.1. The in-
terviews lasted 30e90 min and were conducted face-to-face or via
telephone with one to two researchers present. The interviews
were recorded (for later veriﬁcation) and notes were taken (Patton,
2002). Representative quotes have been translated into English.
Questions during the interviews revolved around two main topics,
notably modernisation of public street lighting (participating ac-
tors, processes and facilitators) and the role of different modes of
governance (see appendix for details). Supporting data cannot be
made openly available due to ethical concerns (privacy of the re-
spondents) but can be obtained by researchers upon request.om Pint and Baldwin (1997, p. 4)).
/Markets
Long-term performance
contracts
Simple short-term contracts
g ESCO solutions Lighting arrangement for a recurring
event
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available at the Sustainable Business Institute (SBI) Contact: www.
sbi21.de.
3.4. Data analysis
We systematically evaluated the collected archival documents,
analysed the interview protocols and reﬂected these against the
bulk of documentations. We then analysed the material according
to the research question concerning barriers to the uptake of
innovative EUED technologies as well as the possible role of alter-
native modes of governance (Section 2.2) for accelerated uptake of
public LED street lighting and addressing the corresponding chal-
lenges (see Section 2.1). In this process we identiﬁed the following
main topics:
 Technological drivers and barriers
 Institutional drivers and barriers
 Economic and ﬁnancial drivers and barriers
 Competency and capacities as both are required to examine and
technological, institutional and economic/ﬁnancial barriers and
to enhance the diffusion of innovative EUEDs
These were reﬂected against concepts of TCE (technical asset
speciﬁcity, human capital speciﬁcity, dedicated resources, task
complexity and competitiveness of market) in an ‘abductive’ pro-
cess, i.e. the back and forth between theory, interview transcripts
and archival documents (Mantere, 2008). We then compared the
modes of lighting governance, highlighting the suitability for each
in different situations (ﬁnancial situation, competency and capacity
of actors, institutional set-up).
4. Findings: modes of German municipal street lighting
governance and the diffusion of LEDs
This section provides an overview of factors affecting the uptake
of EUEDs using the example of LEDs replacing conventional street
lighting technology. For each section we ﬁrstly present the drivers
and barriers that relate to technology, institutions, competence and
economics/investment. Secondly, we analyse their effects on TCs
and PCs depending on the different modes of governance (see
Table 5 for an overview).
4.1. Technological factors
4.1.1. Technological complexity
LED lighting provides a technological advantage over conven-
tional lighting: higher energy efﬁciency. Despite a high potential for
energy (and PC) savings, the ﬁrst set of barriers to LED diffusion
comprises technological aspects such as the maturity of the prod-
ucts, complexity and uncertainty regarding energy savings and
durability. This was highlighted by LED customers such as ESCOs
and municipalities. Also the manufacturers admit, ‘there is
tremendous uncertainty regarding new measures to evaluate the
performance of LEDs, for example maintenance factors and payback
periods’ (Manufacturer). The TC analysis reveals that technical
change and the lack of standardisation leads to increased technical
asset speciﬁcity and task complexity for the municipality.
4.1.2. Standardisation and warranties
Some LED customers (i.e. MUCOs, EUCOs and municipalities)
further highlightedmissing standardisation and short warranties of
LED due to the early stage in the innovation cycle, as well as
technological path-dependency relating to less innovative and less
efﬁcient lighting systems currently being installed, as barriers toLED uptake. ‘Many sales people from LED manufacturers have been to
our town. There are too many standards and warranty mechanisms’
(Municipal representative). ESCOs on the other hand embrace the
novelty of the technology and base their business model upon
energy savings. In TC terms, barriers associated with the technical
asset speciﬁcity of LED lighting and the task complexity of both
assessing technology offers up-front and M&V for potential savings
translate into higher TCs in the absence of appropriate skills and
capacities. This is more likely to be the case for in-house procure-
ment than for market-based solutions.
4.2. Competency and capacity factors
4.2.1. Municipal competencies
Despite the provision of advice by the German federal govern-
ment and numerous other players such as the German Energy
Agency and the ‘LED lead market initiative’, all stakeholder groups
agreed that missing competency represents a common barrier
among the 11,000 municipalities (BMBF, 2014; SBI, 2013). Compe-
tency barriers relate to the capacity of actors to overcome techno-
logical, market and institutional barriers.
On one hand, municipal representatives often fail to evaluate
the market for LED lighting concerning quality, energy savings and
risks. ‘The implementation of the modernisation is demanding. You
need to know the technical details and test examples in practice
(Municipal representative)’. On the other hand, municipal repre-
sentatives often lack the administrative competency to design
tenders with appropriate quality and endurance criteria and to
carry out comprehensive budgeting and cost management
throughout the procurement process of LED street lighting, which
was highlighted by potential third-party contractors. ‘Usually
[municipal representatives] don't know about their own costs for
lighting. Data about the old lighting systems in terms of energy costs,
investments etc. is missing (Manufacturer)’. These competencies
were not necessary in the past, as more efﬁcient technologies
evolved slowly.
In the case of low human capital speciﬁcity dedicated towards
municipal energy management, outsourcing may be a sensible
option but the difﬁculty of designing tenders may prove too com-
plex a task for a municipality to consider. This translates into high
TCs. Our results show that the responsible decision-makers tend to
ignore or reject market-based solutions as the perceived human
capital speciﬁcity for appropriate tender design is too high.
4.2.2. Open-book accounting and cost-transparency
According to third-party contractors (i.e. MUCOs, EUCOs and
ESCO s alike), a push for open-book accountingwas a robust success
factor since anticipated cost-savings are one of the main drivers for
municipalities to modernise their lighting infrastructure. ‘I think
one of the main barriers is the municipal accounting system. Usually
the overall costs for running their lighting system are higher than what
we estimate during the planning process (ESCO)’. Municipalities also
highlight cost transparency and cost management systems as fa-
cilitators of outsourcing solutions for retroﬁts as the procuring
agency can compare baseline and future scenarios. ‘The main pre-
conditions for effectively modernising the lighting systems lie in a
lighting database and a clear guideline. So you turn that into a func-
tional, neutral tender (Municipal representative)’. However, a lot of
municipalities still lack these systems and procedures. The in-
terviewees agreed upon the need for early decision-makers in-
volvements from local government and administration to further
facilitate their use. Neutral tenders ensure technology-neutral
bidding and realisation although manufacturers fear losing their
long-term partnership with municipalities as a result.
Open-book accounting and cost-transparency lowers TCs for
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ﬁgures enables more precise calculations of potential savings and
adequate tenders to be set up. These factors reduce human capital
speciﬁcity and task complexity for outsourcing as they reduce the
need for information acquisition.
4.2.3. Facilitators
Municipalities and ESCOs highlighted the positive role of facil-
itators (e.g. energy agencies) and other consultants as well as best
practice examples during the tender and implementation process
for the assessment of governance modes. They provide the neces-
sary lighting and planning expertise. If, on the other hand, in-
termediaries and facilitators suffer from a lack of lighting
competence, a bias towards established technologies emerges.
Failing to understand the complexity of tendering processes may
also increase the complexity of determining savings. ‘The building
and energy context requires a lot of expertise. Energy consultants are
lacking the competence for functional lighting tendering. So manu-
facturers and their tools to calculate savings dominate the market
(Energy consultant)’. EUCOs and MUCOs should fulﬁl this role.
However, they are usually reluctant to deploy more innovative
technologies.
In the TC analysis, facilitators in particular hold a critical position
as they may lower the TC for more market-based governance
structures and offset the need for in-house capacities to procure,
implement and manage retroﬁts. Search costs and dedicated hu-
man capital speciﬁcity may be reduced by providing a concrete
overview of available options. However, low human capital speci-
ﬁcity and dedicated resources of facilitators may increase TCs for
more market-based solutions.
4.3. Institutional factors
4.3.1. Property situation and established partnerships
Institutional barriers on the demand side relate to the property
situation (many German municipalities sold their street lighting to
EUCOs) and speciﬁc structural arrangements for the provision of
public street lighting which in Germany has historically often been
a task for MUCOs, as municipalities and ESCOs pointed out. MUCOs
and EUCOs consider themselves capable of dealing with techno-
logical change. However, ‘existing contracts with EUCOs often run for
a very long time and the EUCO only complies with the legal minimum
when it comes to efﬁciency. A switch to LEDs, which would make sense,
does not happen. They use less efﬁcient technologies (ESCO)’. ESCOs
highlighted their technological and tendering competencies, which
are often hindered by the property situation relating to long-term
relational contracts that do not provide the right incentives to
encourage the diffusion of innovative technologies such as LED.
Additionally, manufacturers often dictate the tenders as a result
of long lasting partnerships, a point which was observed by their
clients. This setup implies that they can charge individual prices for
each customer including ESCOs, MUCOs or EUCOs. ‘The manufac-
turers are the winners in this market. They often have long lasting
partnerships with the municipalities, they supply analyses for free.
Many tenders thus specify one product (ESCO)’. Contractual barriers
also relate to lighting arrangements with EUCOs. In many cases
they prevent market-based solutions, particularly EPCs, to be
considered. Our TC analysis reveals that time consuming and costly
switching procedures from one contractor to another translate into
human capital speciﬁcity and increase TCs for more market-based
solutions.
4.3.2. Engaging in more market-based solutions
When municipalities are willing to engage in more market-
based solutions such as performance contracts, experiences tendto be positive. ‘The risks taken by the ESCO exceed the amount of
ﬁnancial savings I have when I do the modernisation by myself
(Municipal representative)’. TC analysis reveals that high human
capital speciﬁcity required for lowering the risk of in-house EUED
retroﬁts may lend itself to more market-based governance struc-
tures such as ESCO solutions, which have the potential to lower TC
and total cost.
However, efforts required to govern the relationship with an
external supplier are associated with task complexity and human
capital speciﬁcity required for negotiating and monitoring con-
tracts. This fact was stressed by third-party contractors and inde-
pendent actors such as energy agencies and ﬁnanciers alike. ‘There
is a complexity problem. Many contract documents exceed 50 pages
(Financial service provider)’. Regarding performance contract design
municipal representatives as well as ESCOs underline transparency,
comprehensibility and a distinct guarantee for energy savings as
beneﬁcial. ‘Guidelines, transparency of the contract and an ESCO that
selects high quality products turned out to be successful (Municipal
representative)’. Regarding the performance contract design,
municipal actors in particular also emphasised the need for ﬂexi-
bility (e.g. to allow for contingencies) and a fair balance of interests
during the contract negotiations. ‘We need ﬂexibility regarding
short- medium- and long-term developments in the markets
(Municipal representative)’. An exact deﬁnition of the baseline,
however, often proves difﬁcult, especially in smaller municipalities.
‘Complexity of [performance] contracting leads to high TCs. Exact
numbers are needed (Energy agency)’. The TC analysis indicates that
increasing experience and enabling structures for retroﬁtting
signiﬁcantly reduce task complexity of performance contracts,
particularly if contractual arrangements align interests by
providing transparency and ﬂexibility.
According to ESCOs, performance contracts also need to be
checked by regulatory bodies when municipalities run on a very
tight budget in need of consolidation. ‘The regulating authorities
need to approve the [performance] contract. The ﬁnancing over the
contract duration needs to be assured (Municipal agency)’. In this
regard, our TC analysis points towards administrative approval as a
dedicated institutional resource to counterbalance missing dedi-
cated municipal resources.
In addition, few organisations target the lighting market with
performance contracts as independent actors observe. ‘Street
lighting does not receive the attention it deserves in terms of potential
cost savings and improvements in lighting quality (Energy agency)’.
Manufacturers, who could also offer performance contracts,
generally show little willingness to enter the service based market
segment as they perceive the margins as low and complexity as
high. In TC terms, specialised ESCOs gain a competitive advantage
in the ﬁeld of lighting. Low competitiveness in the ESCOmarket, on
the other hand, increases TCs as it reduces the likelihood of mu-
nicipalities to consider outsourcing through performance contracts
and discourages ESCOs to provide cost effective solutions.
4.4. Economic/investment factors
4.4.1. Economic (dis)incentives for retroﬁtting
Economic barriers stem from relatively high upfront costs of LED
street lighting. This is of particular relevance for municipalities (but
also for other LED customers) as they typically run on a tight
budget, in some cases tightly controlled by regulatory bodies with
budgetary control powers (see Fig. 1) as highlighted by munici-
palities and facilitators. Volatile energy prices (with a slight upward
trend for end-users) and uncertain price developments for LEDs
increase the complexity of calculating the payback of investments,
as municipalities point out. EUCOs and MUCOs often are less
dependent on market prices and consequently do not consider this
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evaluating signiﬁcant PC savings, which is a prerequisite for
considering any alternative mode of governance for modernisation,
by increasing human capital speciﬁcity and task complexity.
4.4.2. Selling services vs. selling primary energy
EUCOs and MUCOs can realise ﬁnancial savings by lowering the
cost for supplying energy and better procurement conditions
thanks to long lasting contracts with manufacturers. In addition,
they may be both familiar with the current lighting system and
experienced in providing maintenance services for municipalities.
Hence both EUCO and MUCO solutions may (self-reportedly)
exhibit higher savings for the provision of the ﬁnal energy services.
However, these companies may be subject to a conﬂict of interests,
as they engage in selling electricity as opposed to providing energy
efﬁciency services, which was pointed out by ESCOs and indepen-
dent actors such as energy consultants. These actors exhibit con-
servative attitudes towards innovative technologies whichmay also
prevent them from deploying LEDs. ESCOs, on the other hand,
possess better procurement conditions for lighting equipment,
which potentially favours a performance contracting solution for
innovative EUEDs such as LED. TC analysis reveals potential for
lowering TC among market-based governance modes in case the
competitiveness of the energy service market is increased.
4.4.3. Financing costs
Municipal governance modes for retroﬁtting also differ with
regard to their ﬁnancing costs. Municipalities and (publicly owned)
MUCO solutions beneﬁt from low interest rates as public actors
enjoy high creditworthiness. ‘ESCOs [on the other hand] need to
reﬁnance themselves. However, forfeiting is not accepted by many
municipalities. This leads to ﬁnancial constraints for ESCOs (FinancialTable 5
TCE perspective - Factors affecting the governance of novel EUEDs.
Factors affecting uptake of LED and choice of governance mode Transac
Technological factors Measurement and veriﬁcation of savings Techni
task co
Lack of standardisation Techni
task co
Short warranties Techni
task co
Competency and
capacity factors
Cost transparency and neutral tenders Human
task co
Open-book accounting Human
Expert facilitators Human
Institutional factors Lock-in contracts with existing suppliers Human
Risk transferral Human
Transparency and ﬂexibility of outsourcing procedure
and contracts
Human
task co
Administrative approval procedure Dedica
Low energy service market competitiveness Compe
Economic/investment
factors
Volatile energy prices and uncertain technological
development trajectories
Human
task co
Experience of current lighting system and providing
maintenance
Dedica
EUCOs and MUCOs potentially selling and saving
energy
Compe
Financing environment Compeservice provider)’. TC analysis reveals that ESCO solutions might
exhibit higher ﬁnancing costs, which reduces their potential to cut
PC.
5. Discussion
5.1. Barriers to LED diffusion and outsourcing
Our ﬁndings provide an overview of technological, institutional,
competency and economic barriers to the diffusion of novel EUEDs,
especially in the procurement process (Bratt et al., 2013; Testa et al.,
2016). First, LED customers and manufacturers alike have a similar
perception of risks associated with technological uncertainty and
missing warranties (Foxon and Pearson, 2008; Schleich, 2009;
Sorrell et al., 2004). Depending on the business model of the cli-
ents (i.e. municipalities, MUCOs EUCOs or ESCOs), however, novelty
may be embraced to harness and maximise savings. Second, insti-
tutional barriers such as administrative procedures, information
asymmetries, path-dependency and property situations speciﬁcally
relate to incumbent actors such as EUCOs and MUCOs (Chadha,
2011; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2012). This pre-
vents new energy service solutions to enter the market which
would increase competition and hence efﬁciency in the long run.
This is aggravated by an inadequate political environment. Third,
we conﬁrm competency barriers to EUED diffusion such as low
visibility, other priorities, lack of time and capacities to evaluate
EUED markets on the client side (Gallagher et al., 2006; Kley et al.,
2011; Sorrell et al., 2004). However, these barriers could be reduced
by increasing transparency (for M&V) and encouraging open-book
accounting, which also beneﬁt market-based solutions. Fourth,
economic barriers such as (small) scale, low or volatile energy
prices and long payback periods severely impact the viability oftion costs (TC) TCs for governance mode
Lowering TCs Increasing TCs
cal asset speciﬁcity and
mplexity
For MUCO, EUCO
solutions
For ESCO solution
cal asset speciﬁcity and
mplexity
For MUCO, EUCO, ESCO
solutions
For in-house
cal asset speciﬁcity and
mplexity
For MUCO, EUCO, ESCO
solutions
For in-house
capital speciﬁcity and
mplexity
For ESCO, MUCO, EUCO
solution
For in-house
capital speciﬁcity For ESCO, MUCO, EUCO
solution
For in-house
capital speciﬁcity For ESCO, MUCO, EUCO
solution
For in-house
capital speciﬁcity In-house, MUCO or EUCO
solution
For ESCO solution
capital speciﬁcity For ESCO solution, EUCO
solution
For in-house, MUCO
solution
capital speciﬁcity and
mplexity
For ESCO solution For in-house, MUCO and
EUCO solution
ted resources For in-house solution,
MUCO, EUCO
For ESCO solution
titiveness of the market In-house, MUCO or EUCO
solution
For ESCO solution
capital speciﬁcity and
mplexity
For ESCO solution For in-house, MUCO, EUCO
solution
ted resources For EUCO or MUCO
solution
For in-house, ESCO solution
titiveness of the market ESCO solution For in-house, EUCO, MUCO
solution
titiveness of the market For in-house, EUCO,
MUCO solution
For ESCO solution
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Sorrell et al., 2004). Market-based business models could partly
offset these barriers through performance contracts and risk
transfer from the municipality to the third-party contractor.5.2. Modes of governance for procuring and retroﬁtting end-use
energy demand technologies
Based on the TC analysis of factors relating to the diffusion of
EUEDs, we developed a taxonomy relating to the optimal mode of
governance in different procurement set-ups (see Table 6). First of
all, municipalities could manage EUED procurement, imple-
mentation and management in-house. To achieve economically
viable solutions, signiﬁcant technical and commercial know-how to
evaluate technologies, markets and the institutional background is
required. This translates into high TCs for retroﬁtting as human
capital and technical asset speciﬁcity associated with potentially
risky investments in innovative technology are high. There is also a
danger of lower PC savings by inadvertently deploying inefﬁcient
products. However, if sufﬁcient capacities are available and risk can
be adequately mitigated against, in-house solutions provide the
greatest opportunities for cost savings by maximising municipal
control (Hannon and Bolton, 2015). If technological barriers can be
overcome, the municipality features high competency and capacity,
institutional factors remain intransparent and the economic situ-
ation stabilises, in-house approaches for retroﬁtting feature lowest
TC (see Table 6).
Second, municipalities may be able to choose relational con-
tracts with MUCOs for retroﬁtting EUEDs (which is of particular
relevance in Germany given their presence in manymunicipalities).
As these trusted relationships feature interwoven knowledge of
existing technologies and infrastructure, the task complexity for
contract management and the human and technical asset speci-
ﬁcity of MUCO solutions for EUED retroﬁtting and diffusion are
likely to be low (see Table 5) (Backlund and Eidenskog, 2013;
Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). Relational contracts with a MUCO
could therefore have an advantage over an in-house, long-term
EUCO or ESCO solution. On the other hand, these companies usually
supply energy to the municipality as well, which may reduce their
incentive to apply innovative EUED technologies.We hereby extend
the discussion surrounding energy services and the resulting
design of public-private partnerships in the utilities sector and
possible forms of ownership or control (Hannon and Bolton, 2015;
Hartmann et al., 2014; Roehrich et al., 2014). A MUCO solution
features lowest TC in case of high technological uncertainty, low
municipal capacities, an unfavourable institutional environment
and a favourable economic environment (see Table 6).
Third, long-term contracts with a EUCO provide the beneﬁt of
large, often systemic companies rolling out technologies on a large
scale and providing municipalities with simple municipal buy-in
options. The downside is that there is little incentive for EUCOs toTable 6
Taxonomy of governance modes.
Factors affecting the uptake of EUEDs (LED) Characteristics of the factors
Technological factors High (new complex technology, uncer
Low (standardised, proven technology
Competency and capacity factors High (in-house capacities and/or facil
Low (no capacities, facilitators)
Institutional factors Favourable (energy service market, ris
Unfavourable (lack of transparency, o
Economic/investment factors Favourable (predictable energy prices
Unfavourable (volatile energy prices,push for the diffusion of innovative technologies, especially in the
absence of performance related contractual elements. We thereby
present technology speciﬁc results to the discussion surrounding
EUCOs role in the low-carbon transition (Hannon et al., 2013).
Long-term contracts exhibit the lowest TC if a standardised, proven
technology is being used and lowmunicipal capacities prevail. This
mode of governance also requires favourable institutional and
economic environments (see Table 6).
Fourth, performance contracts with ESCOs may achieve cost
savings from the beginning of the contract and additional cost
savings due to freed personnel capacity. However, the transfer of
risks and uncertainty regarding technological components and
development from the municipality towards the ESCO goes hand in
hand with a loss of municipal decision-making rights. On the other
hand, ESCOs may combine EUED retroﬁtting with energy or facil-
ities management services using innovative business models
(Bertoldi et al., 2014; Hannon et al., 2013; P€at€ari and Sinkkonen,
2014). From a TC perspective, an ESCO solution is most viable for
innovative technologies, low municipal competencies and an
unfavourable economic environment. To achieve its potential,
however, a favourable institutional environment is required (see
Table 6).
With our analysis we extend the view of previous studies that
performance contracts can lead to lower costs for the provision of
energy services (Hall et al., 2016; P€at€ari and Sinkkonen, 2014). In
case customers demand high ﬂexibility during the contract dura-
tion as they fear being locked into unknown new technologies, our
results conﬁrm previous ﬁndings which suggest an emphasis on
the establishment of trusting relationships, particularly during the
set-up of the contract (Backlund and Eidenskog, 2013; Roehrich and
Lewis, 2014). To fully exploit the potential of market-based solu-
tions in the municipal context, we can conﬁrm the need for tenders
not to over-specify to allow technology neutral bidding (Testa et al.,
2016; Uyarra et al., 2014).5.3. Using TCE for the analysis of governance modes for municipal
energy service provision
We contribute to the literature on energy service markets
(Marino et al., 2011; Nolden and Sorrell, 2016; P€at€ari and
Sinkkonen, 2014; Sorrell, 2007) a qualitative TCE framework that
can be used to analyse different modes of governance for public-
private interaction. LEDs provide a particularly good case study
for applying TCE due to the nature of the underlying technology (its
‘isolation’, economies of scale and large energy savings). Public
sector LED street lighting is also likely to fulﬁl several preconditions
hypothesized by Sorrell (2007) for outsourcing using performance
contracts, such as low technical asset speciﬁcity and low human
capital speciﬁcity. However, our assessment of technological,
institutional and economic barriers points towards enhanced
competencies on the municipal side as a prerequisite forMode of governance with lowest TC
tainty) MUCO, ESCO solution
) In-house solution, EUCO solution
itator) In-house solution
ESCO, EUCO, MUCO solution
k is transparent, budgetary control) EUCO, ESCO solution
paque administrative rules) In-house, MUCO solution
, low ﬁnancing costs, reliable partners) In-house, MUCO or EUCO solution
adverse incentives, high ﬁnancing costs) ESCO solution
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erate the diffusion of innovative EUEDs (see Table 5).
Analysing the diffusion of other EUEDs is nevertheless likely to
bemore complicated given the particular characteristics of lighting,
speciﬁcally street lighting. Despite these limitations, our approach
provides insights into drivers and barriers that constitute techno-
logical, economic, institutional or competency factors and how
these in turn relate to higher or lower TCs of EUED procurement
and retroﬁtting. Many of our case study participants considered the
energy service fee for ESCO solutions comparatively low compared
to the risk and complexity associated with in-house procurement
and retroﬁtting of new energy related products (such as LED) and
services. This is particularly relevant for street lighting as many
municipalities rarely engage in the procurement of retroﬁts and
hardly any have experience with LEDs. In the absence of MUCOs
and trusted EUCOs (and when the municipality features low in-
house competency and a tight budget), our TCE analysis reveals
that ESCOs can reduce human capital speciﬁcity for retroﬁtting and
contribute to reducing opportunistic behaviour towards the mu-
nicipality, especially if ESCOs act as facilitators between EUED
providers and municipalities. With an ESCO solution, municipal-
ities might be able to source comprehensive knowledge from the
market. Table 5 suggests that standard procurement rules, model
contracts as well as facilitators could help lower TCs for market-
based and especially ESCO solutions, which coincides with earlier
ﬁndings by Bleyl et al. (2013), Roehrich and Lewis (2014) and
Nolden et al. (2015).
Our major contribution to the advancement of TCE is its suit-
ability for the analysis of different modes of governance for EUED
procurement and retroﬁtting (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Sorrell,
2007; Toffel, 2002). Factors inﬂuencing the diffusion of EUEDs in
general (technology, competency, institutional and economic) have
been related to factors inﬂuencing the TCs of different governance
modes (technical asset and human capital speciﬁcity, dedicated
resources, task complexity, competitiveness), to compare the
viability of various modes of governance. Based on our results we
argue to include the notion of competencies and capacities (quality
and quantity), which tend to be ‘hidden’ behind ‘dedicated re-
sources’ and ‘human capital speciﬁcity’ in TCE frameworks (Pint
and Baldwin, 1997; Sorrell, 2007; Toffel, 2002).
6. Conclusions and implications
6.1. Conclusions
Our ﬁndings show that the municipal choice of governance
options for procuring and retroﬁtting EUEDs depends on techno-
logical, institutional, competency and economic factors (see
Table 6). In the absence of sufﬁcient in-house capacities, relational
contracting options (MUCOs), trusted partnerships for conventional
long-term contracts (EUCOs) or emergent performance based ESCO
solutions represent a vehicle for the commercialisation and diffu-
sion of EUEDs.
The design and content of tenders emerged as a key phase
during the adoption of EUEDs and the assessment of governance
options. To address competency and capacity barriers, criteria to
design these tenders should be widely diffused to increase trans-
parency and competition among organisational (governance)
structures, including documentation and guidelines or instruments
to calculate baseline and savings (e.g. with standard tendering
processes). Also, there is the need for ﬂexibility when negotiating
contracts with third parties. Intermediaries (e.g. consultants or
energy agencies) emerged as key drivers for retroﬁtting and the
diffusion of EUEDs in general and more market-based modes of
governance in particular as they may address competency andcapacity gaps, which represent the main barrier.
High associated TCs might hinder competition among more
market based solutions and consequently decrease competition in
the energy service market. Our results emphasise the discrepancy
between the theoretical ﬁt of market-based solutions, particularly
given unfavourable economic conditions highlighted in Table 6, and
actual diffusion. Only 3% of German municipalities use ESCO solu-
tions. In other European countries EPC also represents a niche
application (Combines, 2014; Transparense, 2013), which points
towards the existence of strong interdependencies between actors
and a conservative institutional environment. This ‘lock-in’ may be
a reason for the slow diffusion of LED lighting as a case in point,
EUEDs in general and/or ESCO solutions which could increase
competition in the energy service market. The presence of a MUCO
provides a particularly strong case for maintaining such a set-up as
it provides opportunities to strengthen local capacity to manage
energy and retain beneﬁts from the diffusion of innovative EUEDs,
which could be an incentive for municipalities in other countries to
establish MUCOs by learning from the German case. Experience
with EPCs for street lighting, on the other hand, is likely to reduce
the TCs for the diffusion of other EUEDs using performance
contracts.
6.2. Implications for policy makers and managers
As performance contracts prove very useful to accelerate the
diffusion of LED street lighting and associated services in resource
and capacity constrained municipalities, providing tender guide-
lines and resources for intermediary organisations can accelerate
the diffusion of performance contracting, which in turn encourages
the diffusion of LEDs. Experiencewith EPCs for street lighting is also
likely to reduce the TCs for the diffusion of other EUEDs using
performance contracts.
Currently, in this speciﬁc early phase of commercialisation of
LED, there are no standards established and the typically guaran-
teed life time of the components and LEDs (to harness energy
savings) is shorter than the pay-back period of the investment.
Hence technological standards or enhanced warranties to address
technological complexity as well as standard contracts to address
legal complexity are required. Also, introducing statutory obliga-
tions for tendering to include more market-based solutions can
improve the choice and competition among governance modes,
which may foster competition in the energy service market. These
could be established at a national level to actively support the
diffusion of EUEDs at the local level. Additionally, policy-makers
need to address institutional barriers by providing the infrastruc-
ture necessary to facilitate the implementation of innovative
EUEDs, for example by rethinking long-term partnerships with
MUCOs, EUCOs or other partners such as lighting manufacturers at
the municipal level. Depending on the institutional set-up, estab-
lishing a performance contract with a MUCO could also be a way to
lower the costs and risk associated with modernisation.
As highlighted above, to further foster the choice between hi-
erarchical and market-based solutions, policymakers need to sup-
port facilitators (e.g. consultants or energy agencies) to disseminate
speciﬁc technological and commercial knowledge (Bleyl et al.,
2013; see also Lemon et al., 2015; Nolden and Sorrell, 2016). Cor-
responding regulations could be introduced at the national or state
level. Although not speciﬁcally the focus of this research, market-
based solutions for lighting such as performance contracts often
face a lack of ﬁnance, which represents a signiﬁcant economic
barrier. Government owned banks (such as Germany's KfW), or
governments themselves, could provide credit guarantees to
improve access to ﬁnance to increase the competitiveness of the
LED street lighting market and the wider EUED market as a policy
F. Polzin et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 139 (2016) 133e145 143response at the national level.
From a managerial perspective, we speciﬁcally highlight impli-
cations for ESCO market players, as these are new to the lighting
market. ESCOs targeting the public market for energy efﬁciency
should focus on a combination of products and services that ﬁts the
underlying prolonged technological lifecycle. Providing munici-
palities with a range of complementary services may increase their
customer loyalty and reduce energy consumption and related costs
in the long run. ESCOs need to follow an open-book approach in
order to attract attention from municipal clients demanding high
transparency, ﬂexibility and a balance of interests. The use of
standard contracts may fulﬁl these requirements (BMBF, 2014; SBI,
2013).
6.3. Limitations and future research
Our use of TCE in exploratory qualitative research, as opposed to
rigorous model testing, exhibits limitations regarding the measur-
ability of the constructs. Conclusions derived from this study are
based on the recognition of patterns and do not represent gener-
alizable results. However, due to the breadth of governance modes
analysed, the ﬁndings are transferable to other contexts.
Our conclusions derived from this study form the basis for a
quantitative survey (i.e. a survey of local authorities). Further
analysis of markets and technologies could be valuable to explore
the viability of more market-based governance structures in
different institutional contexts. Finally, the conditions for market-
based solutions to maintain a competitive position provide an
interesting ﬁeld for future research (Hannon et al., 2013; Hannon
and Bolton, 2015). In relation to that, scholars could further
explorewhy the creation of a market for performance contracts in a
public context did not achieve its potential so far (P€at€ari and
Sinkkonen, 2014).
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7.1. Interview guide
Modernisation of (retroﬁtting) public street lighting (by using LED).
 How does the process of modernisation (retroﬁtting process)
unfold in the municipalities?
 Which technologies have been applied in the modernisation
process (retroﬁt)?
 What role did the participating actors (EUCOs, MUCOs ESCOs,
manufacturers and ﬁnancial service providers) play?
 What factors inﬂuence their decision making?
 How does the regulatory or political environment inﬂuence the
modernisation process?
Role of energy service contracts (EPC).
 What are perceived speciﬁc success factors and barriers of EPC
for LED street lighting in a municipal context?
 How is technological and ﬁnancial risk treated in these
arrangements?
 Can EPC accelerate the diffusion of eco-innovations?7.2. Interview participantsFormat Date Interviewer
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP, PvF
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP
In person Jan 2014 FP
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP
Via telephone Nov 2013 FP
In person Nov 2013 FP
Via telephone Nov 2013 FP
Via telephone Nov 2013 FP
Via telephone Nov 2013 FP
In person Jan 2014 FP
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP, PvF
In person Nov 2013 FP
Via telephone Dec 2013 FP
In person Jan 2014 FP
In person Nov 2013 FP
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP
Via telephone Oc 2013 FP
Via telephone Nov 2013 PvF
Via telephone Nov 2013 FP
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP
(continued on next page)
Table A.1 (continued )
Nr Category Position Format Date Interviewer
22 Municipal-utility companies MUCOs CEO Via telephone Oct 2013 PvF
23 Municipal-utility companies MUCOs Lighting manager Via telephone Nov 2013 FP
24 Municipal-utility companies MUCOs Lighting manager Via telephone Dec 2013 FP
25 Municipal-utility companies MUCOs CEO Via telephone Dec 2013 FP
26 Municipal-utility companies MUCOs Lighting manager In person Jan 2014 FP
27 Financial service providers Key account manager for municipal clients Via telephone Nov 2013 PvF
28 Financial service providers Expert on ﬁnancing energy efﬁciency projects Via telephone Jan 2014 FP, PvF
29 Financial service providers Key account manager for municipal clients Via telephone Jan 2014 FP, PvF
30 Regulatory bodies Municipal budgetary expert Via telephone Jul 2013 FP
31 Regulatory bodies Municipal budgetary expert Via telephone Jul 2013 FP
32 Regulatory bodies Municipal budgetary expert Via telephone Jul 2013 FP
33 Regulatory bodies Municipal budgetary expert Via telephone Oct 2013 FP
34 Facilitators Energy agency Via telephone Oct 2013 FP
35 Facilitators Energy agency Via telephone Oct 2013 FP
36 Facilitators Public property manager In person Dec 2013 PvF
37 Facilitators Energy consultant In person Nov 2013 FP
38 Facilitators Energy consultant Via telephone Dec 2013 FP
39 Facilitators Municipal agency Via telephone Dec 2013 FP
40 Facilitators Energy agency Via telephone Nov 2013 FP
Notes: Friedemann Polzin (FP), Paschen von Flotow (PvF).
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